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CULTURE, NATIONHOOD, AND THE
HUMAN RIGHTS IDEAL
Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol*
Sharon Elizabeth Rush**
INTRODUCTION
This Symposium on Culture, Nation, and LatCrit Theory con-
tinues the exciting work of a very young but productive branch of
critical movements. LatCrit is a theoretical movement initiated as a
distinct discourse within critical legal theory. Its origins are trace-
able to the first colloquium organized with the purpose of having
Latina/o law professors and their friends critically explore the po-
sition of Latinas/os within the Academy and society. It precipitated
an inquiry concerning what the politics of identity mean through a
Latina/o lens, which, by necessity, is a panethnic prism. This first
colloquium took place during the 1995 Annual Meeting of the
Hispanic National Bar Association in Dorado, Puerto Rico. That
gathering started the momentum for the regular planning of reun-
iones that promote the interrogation of what it means to be
Latina/o in our diverse world, which necessarily promotes the re-
lating of the Latina/o condition to other groups' locations,
interests, and issues. Indeed, a central goal and foundational
premise of LatCrit is to be diverse and inclusive
* Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of
Law. B.A. 1974, Cornell University;J.D. 1978, Albany Law School of Union University; LL.M.
1982, New York University School of Law. Un milli6n de gracias to Margaret Montoya and
Gema Pdrez-Sfinchez for their inspirational works and to the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform and the University of Michigan Journal of Race & Law for their furtherance of the
LatCrit and human rights discourses and providing this opportunity to show how they can
work together. Many thanks to Neera Anand for her assistance with this work.
** Irving Cypen Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. B.A.
1974, Cornell University;J.D. 1980, Cornell Law School.
1. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and
Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 503, 507-08 (1998); see generally Symposium, Comparative Lati-
nas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 875 (1999), 4 U. TEX.
HISPANIC L. J. 1 (1999); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of
Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 1 (1997). Thus, the original gathering and
those that have taken place since are multiethnic, mtltiracial experiences where commu-
nity transcends and embraces racial, ethnic, national, linguistic, sexual, gender, class, and
religious differences and commonalities. Significantly, particularly in the context of the
importance of literature in the Academy, this young movement has produced an expansive
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Although LatCrit theory has concerned itself with the location
of Latinas/os in society, as this Symposium evidences, it comprises
many scholars from various and diverse disciplines and perspec-
tives. Its interrogations do not stop within chartered geographies
but rather traverse national, linguistic, racial, ethnic, sexual, cul-
tural, historical, religious, and class borders and their multiple
intersections. Thus, while LatCrit theory does not speak with one
voice, it does have a unified purpose: to explore the boundaries of
law, sociology, psychology, economics, history, anthropology, edu-
cation, and other fields in a non-essentialist, anti-subordination
posture that aims to liberate the human spirit so that all, from
North and South, East and West alike, can share and enjoy full
personhood around the global supper table. Because of these
common goals, as Professor Francisco Valdes has articulated, "the
multiple diverse critical legal scholars who have coalesced around
the collective effort to articulate LatCrit theory have exhibited ...
[a] sense of shared groupness."
2
This Symposium on nation and culture illustrates these LatCrit
goals and advances them. The two main works and the commen-
taries on them are rich explorations and representations of the
voices and concerns of LatCrit theory. This Foreword engages all
the works by focusing on the concept of voice and silence. Part I
and impressive series of published colloquia. See Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os: Identity,
Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1999); Symposium, Difference,
Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo Communities through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA CHICANO-
LATINO L. REv. 1 (1998); Colloquy, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28
U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 177 (1996-97); Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Namingand
Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 1 (1997); Col-
loquium, Representing Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA LJ. 1
(1996). In addition, the proceedings of LatCrit V are slated for publication in the Denver
University Law Review and the proceedings of LatCrit VI will be published in the University of
Florida Law Review. See generally, THE LATINA/O CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); Berta Esperanza Hernfndez-Truyol, Borders
(En)gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 882 (1997)
[hereinafter Hernfindez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered]; Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol,
Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 69 (1996)
[hereinafter Herndndez-Truyol, Building Bridges II] (suggesting the use of international
human fights to establish Latinas'/os' claim to civil and political rights as well as to social,
economic, and cultural rights), Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Building Bridges III-
Personal Narratives, Incoherent Paradigms, and Plural Citizens, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 303,
307-08 (1998) [hereinafter Hernindez-Truyol, Building Bridges I1] (aspiring to building of
bridges between and among communities of color within the United States and suggesting
the globalizing of those interests as a means of attaining full citizenship and enjoyment of
human rights).
2. Francisco Valdes, Foreword-Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity
Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practice to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 7 n.25 (1996).
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locates the works in the axis of silence and power. Part II explores
how critical theory and international human rights norms can be
used to develop a progressive methodology to analyze and detect
the exclusion or silencing of myriad voices. This Part develops a
LatCritical Human Rights paradigm that, by internationalizing
voice, serves as a useful tool to explore power-based silencing. Fi-
nally, in Part III, the authors illustrate how the proposed paradigm
can focus the issues of culture and nation in a way that allows us to
promote a non-essentialist, anti-subordination, inclusive person-
hood ideal.
I. SILENT COMPLICITY
This Symposium raises many important issues about silence, in-
cluding an examination of the meaning of silence in power
relationships. More specifically, Professor Margaret Montoya's arti-
cle, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in
Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, presents a heartfelt
story about graffiti in the women's restroom at her school that de-
picted her in an extremely offensive and hurtful way.3 She probes
many difficult and pressing issues about the silence of minority
and women students in our classrooms. Her article is a description
and analysis of the struggle she and other subordinated people
experience as we grapple with the question of whether we should
publicly denounce hateful speech. Although many professors attest
to the general silence of minority and women students, like Profes-
sor Montoya, we are not quite sure what it means and accordingly
do not know how or even if we should stop and try to do some-
thing about it.
Joining Professor Montoya in grappling with the complex topic
of the meaning of silence are Professors Steven Bender and
Dorothy Roberts. Professor Bender, in his piece, Silencing Culture
and Culturing Silence: A Comparative Experience of Centrifugal Forces in
the Ethnic Studies Curriculum,4 bolsters Professor Montoya's analysis
about the irrelevance of minorities' voices to the majority culture.
3. Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Le-
gal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 847 (2000), 33 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM 263 (2000).
4. Steven W. Bender, Silencing Culture and Culturing Silence: A Comparative Experience of
Centnfugal Forces in the Ethnic Studies Curriculum, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 913 (2000), 33 U.
MICH.J.L. REFOR.M 329 (2000).
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Professor Bender's analysis of the problem of the "institution-
alization" of minorities' silence reinforces Professor Montoya's ob-
servations about the complexity of the problems minorities face in
trying to participate in meaningful ways in the discourse about the
relationships among power, subordination, and identity.
In her essay, The Paradox of Silence: Some Questions about Silence as
Resistance,' Professor Roberts focuses on the ambiguity surround-
ing the meaning of silence. She examines the difficulty we have as
educators in knowing whether silence is resistance or whether it is
a defense mechanism, often involuntarily imposed on minorities to
protect ourselves from hostile voices.6 Moreover, Professor Roberts
highlights that hostile voices are heard by subordinated people
everywhere: from the doctor, the welfare agent, and even the wel-
fare law itself.7 She agrees with Professor Montoya that our
challenge perhaps is "not to figure out a theoretical distinction
between subjugation and resistance, but to listen to those who
have been silenced so that we might learn how to work toward a
more just society.",8
Professor Roberts is correct about the importance of listening to
silenced people. This is readily apparent in Professor Gema Prez-
Sdnchez's article, Franco's Spain, Queer Nation?,9 an informative and
thoughtful examination of the effort by Francisco Franco and his
administration to repress socially deviant behavior, particularly
homosexuality. Although seemingly unrelated to the topic of si-
lence, silence is a significant aspect of the article. Specifically,
Professor Pdrez-Sdnchez's article makes a significant contribution
to the literature because of "the lack of historical studies about
Spanish-speaking lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered peo-
ple."' She speaks to the silence of other scholars who have chosen
not to write about homosexuality in Franco's oppressive regime.
Professors Ratna Kapur and Tayyab Mahmud enrich our under-
standing of Franco's oppression of sexual minorities in their essay,
Hegemony, Coercion, and Their Teeth-Gritting Harmony: A Commentary
5. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Paradox of Silence: Some Questions about Silence as Resistance,
5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 927 (2000), 33 U. MICH.J.L. RErOP-m 343 (2000).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 931, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REom' at 347.
9. Gema Ptrez-Sfnchez, Franco's Spain, Queer Nation?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 943
(2000), 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 359 (2000).
10. Id.
[VOL. 5:817
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on Power, Culture, and Sexuality in Franco's Spain." They provide a
rich critique of Professor P~rez-Sinchdz's presentation of her
theoretical understanding of the relationship between State power
and repression and offer alternative ways of understanding that
part of Spain's history. Similarly, Professor Peter Kwan's piece,
Querying a Queer Spain Under Franco,12 supports the importance of
Professor P~rez-Sdnchez's analysis of the dearth of literature in this
area and pleads for a more thorough explanation of her claim
"that under Franco, Spanish nationalism was somehow dependent
upon or even threatened by the Spanish gay community, . . . since
... lesbians were simply invisible to Francoism and gay men were
deeply fearful and closeted.'
3
Professor Kwan's insight provides a more subtle but important
way in which all of the pieces in this Symposium are related to si-
lence. The articles and comments speak volumes about the way in
which complicity in silence promotes hegemony. Thus, not only is
it important to listen to the people who have been silenced-
Professor Montoya herself, those who want to teach about
"difference," the sexual minorities under Franco's regime-but it
is also important to ask: Why are majority members who believe in
justice afraid to speak out when they see injustice?
As the following story highlights, most of us are not above speak-
ing out. Recently, at our first faculty meeting of the year, one of
the co-chairs of our appointments committee presented the hiring
policy to us for adoption. Detailed in the proposed policy were our
many curricular needs, as well as a statement that we are commit-
ted to diversity in hiring. Moreover, the co-chair emphasized that
because two African American colleagues had resigned within the
last two years and a third was on a two-year visit at another law
school (and unclear as to whether she would return), it was espe-
cially important for us to diversify our faculty.
The immediate response to the co-chair's comments came from
a colleague who opined that it seemed that an emphasis on
diversity in hiring in recent years had interfered with our ability to
fill curricular needs. He stated that our policy ought to be to hire
the best qualified candidates who will teach the courses we need to
have taught. Although the former chair of appointments noted
11. Ratna Kapur & Tayyab Mahnud, Hegemony, Coercion and Their Teeth-Gritting Har-
mony: A Commentary on Power, Culture, and Sexuality in Franco's Spain, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
995 (2000), 33 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 411 (2000).
12. Peter Kwan, Queryinga Queer Spain Under Franco, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 989 (2000),
33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 405 (2000).
13. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 992, 33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM at 408.
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that in the past, offers to diverse candidates were consistent with
both quality and curricular coverage, few other colleagues
expressed support for a curricular need approach to hiring and
intimated that quality and diversity were mutually exclusive.
This sentiment evoked a rebuttal from Kenneth Nunn, our As-
sociate Dean for Law Center Affairs, the only African American on
the active faculty. He was clearly offended by the suggestions that
to diversify the faculty we needed to lower our standards. Many, if
not the majority of us, were also offended by the suggestion, which
became apparent as we talked about it afterward.
Not surprisingly, the more vocal members of the faculty could
not refrain from reiterating their beliefs. One comment in particu-
lar impugned the integrity of the entire appointments committee,
however. A member of that committee immediately stated how the
comment had offended her, and "I agree" came from across the
room before the meeting was adjourned.
Shortly after the meeting, Professor Nunn resigned from his po-
sition as Associate Dean. He could not believe that none of us
publicly supported him as he tried to defend the position that di-
versity and quality go together. In light of the general
unsupportive environment of racial minorities at the law school,
the absence of public support at the faculty meeting was too much
for him. Silence through an omission can be as actively destructive
and hurtful as any commission.
This underlying and powerful theme of silence and silencing
permeates the works in this Symposium issue. All of the situations
presented opportunities for the majority to speak against the injus-
tices they witnessed. Oppressive regimes are allowed to exist
because members of a powerful group, through their silence, act
in complicity with the oppressors. Some may think their silence is
ambiguous. As between the victim and the majority complicitor,
however, it is clear who has the greater responsibility to break the
silence in the face of injustice.
There are, however, two important caveats. First, we do not sug-
gest the subordinated lack agency. To the contrary, as Professor
Montoya's piece suggests, the disempowered can find empower-
ment in voice-even if the disempowered person opts for silence.
Second, we are mindful of problems that can arise when "third
parties" try to speak for others.14 Questions about the speaker's
qualifications to speak for a group of which he or she is not a
14. See SHARON E. RUSH, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A WHITE ADOPTIVE
MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (2000).
[VOL. 5:817
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member are legitimate. But the case of the silent complicitor is
significantly different. He or she does not try to speak for those
who have been unjustly silenced. Rather, the majority member
speaks up about the injustice of silencing that promotes subordina-
tion. He or she distances himself or herself from the hegemony
and actively denounces it.
Thus, the topic of silence is multifaceted. Depending on con-
text, it can be evidence of oppression, resistance, or complicity.
This Symposium is an opportunity to explore the global dimen-
sions of silence in the international human rights arena.
II. RE/FoRmING LAW: CRITICAL THEORY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Critical Race Theory (CRT) generally, and LatCrit specifically as
part of that philosophy, is a movement that at its core is committed
to humanitarian conceptions of personhood-conceptions that
transcend the limitations of current equality doctrine.' Human
rights norms that reflect and dovetail with these CRT aspirations
were first comprehensively embodied in a 1948 United Nations
document known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 6
• 15. See, e.g., Herndndez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered, supra note 1 (discussing the nor-
mative perspective of equality doctrine). Equality narratives in the United States appear
fixated on an "equality as sameness" model. This paradigm has generated an awkward juris-
prudence on issues of race (particularly in the affirmative action context), sex (especially in
the ongoing pregnancy debate), and gendered family hierarchies (notably in discussions
about the public and private including essential but unpaid work). See RICHARD DELGADO,
THE COMING RACE WAR? (1996); CHARLES LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T
Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); James Carney, Why Talk Is
Not Cheap: The Turmoil of Clinton's Race Initiative Is the Latest Evidence of America's Black-White
Distrust, TIME, Dec. 22, 1997, at 32 (citing strife among members of the Initiative's advisory
board, critics, and even White House staffers over the makeup and goals of the President's
Initiative on Race); see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Berta E. Hermindez, To
Bear or not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an International Human Righ 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
309 (1991); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981). Critical
race and feminist theorists have challenged the validity and authority of an equality juris-
prudence that aspires to and insists upon blindness with respect to race, sex, and class
differences-a patently unworkable approach. A realistic reconsideration of the equality
paradigm would acknowledge both sameness and difference, serve to resolve concerns
about fairness and (in)justice, explain the real incongruity between the goals of full partici-
pation in society by all persons and the reality of the invisibility and marginalization of many
individuals and groups, and unite, rather than divide, varied but often interdependent
communities. See Berta Esperanza Herusndez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos
at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric, and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994)
(focusing on Latina/o community diversity within the United States); Herndndez-Tuyol,
Building Bridges II, supra note 1, at 69.
16. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
SUMMER 2000]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VoL. 5:817
240 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 33:3
By declaring the universality of human rights, signatory nations
broke the silence of complicity and committed themselves to speak
up for the silenced minorities. This declaration was a revolutionary
articulation and embrace of a plethora of individual rights central
to personhood, including not only civil and political rights but also
social, economic, cultural, and solidarity rights. 7 The Universal
Declaration, together with CRT, provides a new voice which, in
turn, facilitates an analytical construct from which to consider this
Symposium's works.
The Declaration enables an approach to human dignity that
serves to break global and local cycles of inequality. This originally
hortatory pronouncement, now considered to be customary law,'
serves as a blueprint for "globalizing localisms" and "localizing
globalisms."' 9 By globalizing a localism, we mean an analysis that
17. For writings on these topics by Richard Delgado, a leading critical race theorist,
see, for example, RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE (1995) [hereinafter DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES] and RICH-
ARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS (1999) [hereinafter DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY
ENDS].
18. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-rala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (1980) (noting that, notwith-
standing the distinction between binding treaties and non-binding pronouncements, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is regarded as authoritative law by the international
community); see also Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38 (June
26, 1945) (providing that custom is a source of law); cf The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1899) (noting that "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act orjudicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.").
19. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCI-
ENCE, AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 263 (1995) [hereinafter SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE] (defining "globalized localism" as "the processes by which a
given local phenomenon is successfully globalized, be it the worldwide operation of TNC's, the
transformation of the English language into linguafranca, the globalization of American fast
food or popular music, or the worldwide adoption of American copyright laws on computer
software" and explaining a "localized globalism" as "the specific impact of transnational
practices and imperatives on local conditions that are thereby destructured and restruc-
tured in order to respond to transnational imperatives."). My use of the term "globalized
localism" refers to the use of a domestic critical concept to inform international norms. The
"localized globalism" phrase in this work refers to the use of an international human rights
concept to develop, expand, and transform the context, concept, meaning, and application
of critical theoretical constructs.
Ctrrently, in both international and domestic spheres, it is virtually impossible to travel
through a day without repeated confrontations with the term globalization. However, seldom
will one encounter remotely similar definitions. See id. Professor Santos defines globaliza-
tion as the "process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its
reach over the globe and, by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival condition
or entity as local." BOAVEUTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL CONCEP-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Zeitschrift ffir Rechtssoziologie 18.1 1, 3 (1997) [hereinafter
SANTOS, TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL CONCEPTION]; see also Aihwa Ong, Strategic Sisterhood or
Sisters in Solidarity? Questions of Communitarianism and Citizenship in Asia, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL L.
STUD. 107 (1996) (defining globalization as "the intensified capitalist integration of the
world."). I use the term globalization to refer to the processes by which inter-, intra-, and
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takes a domestic movement, here specifically LatCrit Theory (as
well as CRT generally), global by using the domestic movement to
develop, expand, and transform the context, meaning, and appli-
cation of international human rights norms. The flip-side of the
project that "localizes a globalism" utilizes theoretical and substan-
tive dimensions of human rights norms to develop, expand, and
transform the context, meaning and reach of domestic critical dis-
courses.
The globalization of domestic critical theory reconfigures the
human rights idea, both domestically and internationally, and
transforms it into a truly inclusive paradigm of dignity and person-
hood. Simultaneously, localizing international human rights
norms and principles effects a paradigm shift in which domestic
language of citizenship and equality, in other words, voice, speaks
of incorporating international human rights notions of person-
hood and human dignity.
2 0
The central aims for both human rights and critical theories is
liberation and justice. This convergence of focus presents
opportunities for mutual enrichment. Critical theory movements
analyze the conditions of and seek to empower and give voice to
non-normative or subaltern communities within majority
societies.2 1 These projects are also concerned that praxis-the
effectuation of the theory so as to have meaning for real persons in
real life22 -parallels significant human rights developments
regarding individual rights, including the rights of marginalized,
often silenced groups-that is, ethnic, racial,23 and religious2 4
transboundary movements of capital, information, and persons serve to influence, affect,
and change norms, traditions, and processes of learning, information and goods exchanges,
and lifestyles.
20. See BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL, HUMAN RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION AND
CULTURE: CENTERING PERSONHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL NARRATIVE, IN MORAL IMPERIALISM,
A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL, HUMAN
RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE]; Hernndez-Truyol, Building Bridges A", supra note
1; Hernndez-Truyol, Building Bridges III, supra note 1.
21. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien K Wing ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, (Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITI-
CAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, (Kimberl Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS]; THE LATINA/O
CONDITION, supra note 1; THE POLITICS OF LAW, (David Kairys ed., 1998).
22. See ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).
23. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 350.
24. See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion and Belief G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1982).
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minorities; indigenous/first nations peoples;
25 women;26 children;27
and the rights of peripheral states in the worldwide sphere.2s Both
domestic and human rights discourses engage notions of dignity
and rights of persons in relation to the nation state, but they go
beyond statism and include so-called private conduct and civil
society.
29
Indeed, considering the statist implication of norms, human
rights law is an important component of a project of liberation. In
its short formal existence, human rights law has effectively recon-
figured the doctrine of sovereignty, the formerly omnipotent
power of the state3° to do as it wished with its nationals, wherever
they might be, and with anyone who found himself or herself
within its territorial jurisdiction. 1 Human rights law is revolution-
ary from a statist perspective in that it renders individuals subjects
of international law, rather than just objects. 2 Under the human
25. See Technical Review of the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
26. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, openedfor signature Mar. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33.
27. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (1990) (visited Oct. 9,
2000) <http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm>.
28. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1 (explicitly providing that "[t]he Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"); Report of the World
Summit for Social Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995). But see Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, U.N. Int'l Arb. Trib, translated in 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978)
(finding that U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources (Res. 1803) which was supported by major western powers trumped a parallel
resolution, U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources (Res. 3171), which was strongly supported by developing countries).
29. See, e.g., U.N. World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, 220th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) (including a prohibition of private violence as well
as economic violence); see also IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI (1997)
(discussing the various aspects of society and human well-being in the context of the Haiti
situation); Berta E. Hernhndez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A Re/Conceptualization of
Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607 (1997) (suggesting and providing
numerous examples of the inter-connectedness of civil and political rights with social and
economic rights, as well as the nexus of culture and economic violence against women).
30. See Louis Henkin, An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of State Sover-
eignty, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 115, 118 (1994).
31. For a detailed discussion of the impacts of globalization and sovereignty, see, for
example, CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL FLOWS, TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES (Michael J.
Shapiro & Hayward R. Alker eds., 1996); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL OR-
DER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995); SASKIA SASSEN,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAY ON THE NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND
MONEY (1998); and SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996).
32. See, e.g., The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946) ("Crimes against interna-
tional law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
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rights idea, states are accountable for the treatment of all persons,
citizens and non-citizens alike, within its borders." Human rights
law, then, is a morally compelling tool for denouncing sovereign
actions that derogate the dignity and integrity of personhood and
citizenship. s4
The human rights model enables the aspiration to full person-
hood for all persons of all races and geographies. The regime is
not perfect, however; it has structural flaws in its origins and appli-
cations that need reconstruction before it can serve its potential
for emancipation of the human spirit. It is in this reconstitutive
endeavor that local critical theory can inform global norms.
One location at which local critical theory can effect a transfor-
mative interjection into the international human rights system and
its norms is in presenting a foundation from which to challenge
the Western/Northern hegemonic biases and assumptions 5 of in-
ternational norms. Critical scholars have denounced such
hegemonic underpinnings in local law of norms that were similarly
articulated by and crafted in the image of Western/Northern
power elites. In the domestic arena, critical theorists have success-
fully challenged the objectivity and fairness of a system of laws
crafted by a powerful few that is then imposed on all, even those
who had no voice in creating the system.3 6
Critical writings in the United States have given voice to
"others"; they have deconstructed the legal master narrative to
reveal its elitist and exclusionary foundation in a specific class
(wealthy, propertied, educated), race (White), and sex (male) .s
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."). The Nurn-
berg and Tokyo tribunals were created to address human rights atrocities committed during
World War II and to punish violators. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1982); see generally,
Louis B. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 898-967 (1956).
33. See Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local
Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare
"Reform", 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547 (1998); Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Reconciling
Rights in Collision: An International Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW
NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 39 (Juan F. Perea
ed., 1997).
34. See Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 87 (1993).
35. See SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 19, at 346.
36. See, e.g., DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS, supra note 17, at ch. 6 (discussing in-
herent unfairness of formal and informal legal structures for outsiders).
37. See Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 21, at 64
(describing the "stories... told by the ingroup... [that] provide it with a form of shared
reality in-which its own superior position is seen as natural"); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the
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This local experience suggests that a reconstruction of the human
rights model to transform it into a truly inclusive one appropriate
in today's global context is in order. For example, a critical analysis
of universal norms reveals that these international ideas and ideals
were crafted within specific and narrow social, economic,
historical, and cultural spaces. Such contextualization places in
stark relief the effective imposition on many states of the
perspective, needs, desires, interests, and experiences of a few
powerful people effectively silencing the subaltern, the poor, and
the subordinated.38
Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed
"Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581 (1993).
The success of the White Man's control of the world is debatable; but his success in
making other people act just like him is not. No culture that has come in contact
with Western industrial culture has been unchanged by it, and most have been as-
similated or annihilated, surviving only as vestigial variations in dress, cooking or
ethics.
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED 112 (1996) (citing Ursula K. Le Guin, Feeling
the Hot Breath of Civilization, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct. 29, 1989, at 11); see also DERRICK
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (discussing
the myth of egalitarian, color-blind constitution); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis.
L. REv. 539 (discussing the need for Black women's voices so that issues cease to be viewed
from White middle class perspective); Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its Legal
Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 VILL. L. REV. 767 (1988) (arguing that courts reflect White
supremacy and discussing economic costs of racism); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiogra-
phy and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539
(1991) (arguing that the failure to present personal experiences reinforces majoritarian
perspective); Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of
Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367 (1992) (arguing that the
hearings reflect patriarchal assumptions about women); Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal
Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991)
(critiquing the dominant school of normative jurisprudence); Richard Delgado, Shadowbox-
ing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813 (1992) (discussing the dominant culture's
preference for "objective" norms because they are of benefit to the empowered as they
define the meaning of the rules); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind",
44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the color-blind approach promotes White suprem-
acy); Linda S. Greene, Multiculturalism as Metaphor, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1173 (1992)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's "normative vacuum" results in failure to enforce equality
and inclusion); Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Ine-
quality in PopularFilm, 15 L. STUD. F. 243 (1991) (noting that movies reinforce and replicate
popular culture's view of racial subordination); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy:
Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self
Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence dealing with American Indians comes from medieval European tradition and
law of colonization brought by Columbus and seeks to legitimate cultural racism).
38. An example of the exclusionary process for defining human rights is the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration was signed by
only 48 states, with 8 states abstaining (including Saudi Arabia, the USSR, South Africa, and
Yugoslavia). Today with 185 independent states belonging to the community of nations, the
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Besides unearthing the hegemonic origins of international
norms, a critical theory intervention into the human rights ideas
and system can also provide a forum to explore the role of culture
in the international arena. Indeed, it can afford a landscape in
which to have a serious holistic engagement of the relativism ver-
sus universalism debate. 9 For instance, critical theory questions the
validity of the universalization of normative standards that were
formulated prior to the entrance of the former colonies into the
community of nations. 40 It can influence a post-colonial perspective
for reconstituting appropriate standards, rather than supporting
the acceptance of the interpretation that patently fostered the in-
terests of the colonizers. Critical theory can be a lens through
which international human rights documents are scrutinized to
reveal the hegemonic influences. Once we expose the non-
neutral context in which human rights documents were crafted, we
can reconstruct the rules and redeploy their application in an in-
clusive and just manner. The once silenced minorities can then
speak to an audience willing to listen and act upon their demand
for justice and equality.
The adoption of the Universal Declaration reflected a
commitment by states to enter into one treaty incorporating a
collection of indivisible, interdependent, and inviolable rights that
majority of which never voted on the Declaration, this document is nevertheless broadly
accepted as embodying a plethora of customary universal human rights norms. See Berta
Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence, Evolution,
Revolution in WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (Kelly Askin &
Dorean Koenig eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hernkndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gen-
dered Lens]; Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision in IMMIGRANTS
OUT!, supra note 33, at 257-59 (describing customary norms and international human
rights law); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 18, at art. 38
(citing custom as one of the primary sources of international law).
39. For a more detailed analysis of the Universalism-Relativism debate, see Guyora
Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 211 (1999) and Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Women's Rights As Human
Rights-Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605
(1996).
40. See R. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1987); M.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1986); see generally Herndindez-Truyol, Human Rights
Through a Gendered Lens, supra note 38.
41. Critical analysis, whether or not expressly framed as such, unpacks in the business
context the master narrative of the law and economics ideology too. See, e.g., Claire Moore
Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 399, 401, 422 (1997) (arguing that the commercial terrain is not level); Claire Moore
Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty and Permitted Harm, 22
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 955, 969, 977, 1003 (1995) (arguing that the law and economics perspec-
tive harms the weaker party and that structural inequality is built into partnerships under
the statute drafted and supported by the law and economics scholars).
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include not only civil and political rights, but also social,
economic, cultural, and solidarity rights.4 2 As many human rights
theorists recognize, all levels of rights are necessary for human
flourishing.4 3 Unfortunately, the North/South and East/West as
well as capitalism/communism divides resulted in the bifurcation
of the unified system envisioned in the Declaration into two
separate conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Cultural,
and Social Rights (Economic Covenant)."
Beyond the geopolitical underpinnings and ramifications of this
split, critical theorists can offer additional insights for this division.
For one, a critical analysis unmasks the power imbalance among
the actors. During the meetings concerning a single human rights
convention, the Western/Northern states, reflecting their "equal
access" liberal republican ideology, were comfortable only with the
grant of civil and political rights, that is, those "negative" rights of
individuals to be free from governmental interference. 4 5 These
same states, however, rejected undertaking any positive obligations
involving granting social, economic, and cultural rights.4
6
42. The Universal Declaration included rights to life, liberty, nondiscrimination, and
others such as the prohibition of slavery, inhuman treatment, arbitrary arrest, and arbitrary
interference with privacy which are considered civil and political in nature. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 6, 7, 8 (1)-(2),
15, 16, 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (including rights such as the right to life; freedom from torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery and servi-
tude; nonapplicability of retroactive laws; right to recognition as a person before the law;
and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). The Universal Declaration
also included rights such as the right to social security, full employment, fair working condi-
tions, an adequate standard of living, and participation in the cultural life of the community
which are considered economic, social, and cultural in nature. See International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
43. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); THE QUALITY OF LIFE,
(Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
44. See Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens, supra note 38.
45. Id.; see also Mary G. Dietz, Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship,
DAEDALUS, Fall 1987, at 1, 4-5. Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the liberal vision, while
stuck on civil and political rights even at the expense of the greater societal good, recog-
nized the inviolability premise: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.... The rights secured by justice
are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests." Id. at 4 (quoting
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 3-4 (1971)). Negative rights are those that focus on the
individual's personal rights with the consequent effect of placing limits on actions of gov-
ernments. In contrast, positive fights and those that articulate a social bill of rights have
attached to them positive government obligations. See generally Charles Taylor, Human
Rights: The Legal Culture, excerpted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 173, 174-76 (HenryJ. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996).
46. See Dietz, supra note 45, at 4 ("The life of liberalism.., began in capitalist market
societies, and as Marx argued, it can only be fully comprehended in terms of the social and
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In contrast, both the newly-emerging, so-called third world states
as well as the communist "second world" states saw negative rights
as the master's tools that would not only entrench colonialism but
also maintain the bourgeoisie's power over the masses.17 Former
colonies and the communist bloc firmly held that true liberation
and freedom could only result from the grant of positive rights:
social, cultural, and economic. Negative rights would perpetuate
silence; positive rights would give voice.48
This tension between North/West on the one hand, and the
South/East and communist bloc on the other, resulted in the di-
chotomization of rights contrary to the Declaration's holistic
indiVisibility and interdependence of rights aspiration. To date,
the United States refuses to ratify the Economic Covenant. Even
those Western states that have ratified the Economic Covenant,
view it not as an obligation to create economic rights but rather as
an obligation to enforce in a non-discriminatory manner those
rights the state recognizes; some states, citing to the language used
in the Economic Covenant, even perceive the enumerated rights as
hortatory. Using power as an axis for a critical evaluation of the
process that resulted in the bifurcation of rights leads to the con-
clusion that the resulting structure simply reflects the
institutionalization of the West's narrative; the dominant voice
prevailed, the subordinated remains silenced. A reconstruction is
imperative before there can be a universal platform for human
rights discourse in which no participant is silenced.
The hegemonic Western interpretation misleads one to believe
that only civil and political rights, the so-called "first generation"
rights, are the "real" international human rights. Indeed, the roots
of civil and political rights lie in the American Declaration of
Independence and the French Declaration des Droits de L'Homme
[Rights of Man], documents resulting from the late eighteenth
century political and social uprisings that sought to identify
economic institutions that shaped it."); Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered
Lens, supra note 38.
47. See Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens, supra note 38.
48. See id.; see also The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples of 1960, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960).
49. See Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); see also Martin
Scheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 41, 43 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995).
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impermissible governmental intrusions into individual lives.5 ° Yet,
as critical thinkers have underscored, it is important to recall that
these eighteenth-century social and political revolutions coexisted
with slavery, the decimation of indigenous peoples, and with
women's status as chattel, which are hardly positions of equality or
equal access but rather are classic examples of how power can be
used to silence.5' Thus, while all agree that civil and political rights
such as the rights to non-discrimination, liberty, and security of the
person are not only desirable but necessary, current interventions
into equality discourses require a recognition of their exclusionary
beginnings to ensure that all persons benefit from this historical
legacy. To be sure, as critical theorists would emphasize, a
comprehensive review not only of the documents but also of the
position of the majority of the states in the community of nations
makes plain that economic, social, and cultural rights are not, and
should not be, a second class of rights, even if they are known as
the second generation.
Thus, critical theoretical interventions are valuable resources to
inform global discourses. These locally derived insights provide
the tools for exposing the hegemonic foundations of global
human rights norms much as they have served to expose the non-
neutrality of local laws. In addition, by revealing the flawed origins
and application of norms, the local critical conversations provide a
framework within which to reconstruct the international idea in a
counter-hegemonic, multidimensional, multicultural, inclusive
manner. In these reconstructive efforts it is imperative to ensure
that new notions ofjustice with paramount respect for personhood
50. In contrast, while also based on revolution-the anti-colonialist and post-socialist
revolutions-the champions of social, economic, and cultural rights sought to impose posi-
tive obligations on states for the well being of communities and society.
51. See Romany, supra note 34, at 90 ("[T]he presence of patriarchy in these emanci-
patory structures [of liberalism] reveals the gap between liberal concepts and reality."); see
also Hermindez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens, supra note 38; Ursula Vogel,
Marriage and the Boundaries of Citizenship, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP, 79 (Bart van
Steenbergen ed., 1994).
52. See International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, supra note
42. At this juncture, it is appropriate to mention that an ongoing debate exists between the
Critical Legal Studies school and the Critical Race Theorists regarding the value of rights.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 304 (1987) (criticizing critical legal studies); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1364-71 (1984) (noting rights are unsta-
ble); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE, 84, 86 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (noting
importance of rights language); see also Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and
their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 21, at 641, 657-58.
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do not become synonymous with or exclusive to any group or
ideology.53 The process of reconstruction must be transform-
ational, dynamic, and ongoing in a profoundly unhegemonic way.
The majority must act and speak up or remain silent complicitors
at best.
We have shown in a general way how the local insights can serve
to develop, expand, and transform the global notions of human
rights. Here, for clarification, we offer a few particular examples of
the utility of such local interventions. One example pertains to the
idea of non-discrimination based on sex, which is embraced by vir-
tually all human rights instruments including the U.N. Charter.
The reality of this protection starts to crumble if one looks beyond
the non-discrimination clauses to some of the substantive provi-
sions granting specific rights. While Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
mandates sex equality, Article 20 provides that "any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."
54
On its face, Article 20 does not proscribe, and thus allows, sex-
based advocacy of hatred. Canons of construction-both domestic
from contract law and international from the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties-provide that the general cedes to the spe-
cific. Therefore, the omission of sex from Article 20 signifies that
sex-based violence if at all undesirable, at least does not rise to the
evil of ethnic, race, or religion-based hatred. Such omission is
deeply troubling because the world recognizes that sex-based vio-
lence and other forms of sex inequalities are prevalent and
persistent global problems. 5 Sex-equality notions are silenced; sex-
based hatred is given exclusive public voice.
Certainly, a critically informed analysis suggests that the incon-
sistency in the provisions within the ICCPR be resolved so as to
maximize the protections against discrimination. Moreover, a
critical analysis would also challenge the rules of interpretation
that serve to undercut the human rights ideal. Local theory thus is
an invaluable tool for the reconstruction of global norms in a
fashion sensitive to the intersections of race, sex, ethnicity, class,
religion, language, and sexuality. Such critical theoretical interven-
tions are not only appropriate but also necessary for a truly
53. See Ong, supra note 19, at 109 (defining globalization as "the intensified capitalist
integration of the world"); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the
Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 184-95 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995)
(proposing a principle of group representation).
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 20.
55. See Human Development Report 1995, U.N. Development Programme (1995).
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workable human rights model. Women and others who are victims
of sex-based discrimination are entitled to an equal voice in a just
society.
As critical theorists, the hegemonic foundations of international
human rights norms evident in the construction of sex, race, and
racial power in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Race Convention or CERD) are particularly
intriguing. 6 CERD contains a general nondiscrimination provision
that includes sex. Its preamble refers to a provision of the Univer-
sal Declaration that includes sex. Yet, the Race Convention's
reference to the Declaration deletes sex from the inclusive refer-
ence.
More disturbing, however, in an analysis of hegemonic power in
the international sphere is the definition of racial discrimination
in the Race Convention: "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rec-
ognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field or public life."5 7 This definition, by in-
cluding descent, national, and ethnic origin as racial
classifications, effectively internationalizes and institutionalizes the
U.S. social construction of the race model-the binary
Black/White paradigm. Moreover, the definition in CERD does
not take sex into account. It also effectively racializes ethnicity and
national origin and has the potential to effect erasures of classifica-
tions that are not Black or White.5 s
The LatCrit movement has specifically challenged the confla-
tion of identity factors. Race as a synonym for multiple differences
is a wholly inadequate paradigm for Latinas/os, whose multidi-
mensionality and multiracialness within the United States identity
borderlands can locate Latinas/os as both racial and ethnic oth-
ers.5 Any model that identifies difference as racial and places race
within the Black/White binary not only reflects the dominance of,
but also adopts as "neutral, rational, . . . [and] just" the
56. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, supra note 23.
57. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
58. See DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS, supra note 17, at ch. 8 (discussing how the
Black-White binary erases Latinas/os from the aspirations of civil rights efforts).
59. SeeJuan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of
American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127, 133
(1997).
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North/West perspective-the "perpetrator perspective ''60 in the
international arena. Such a construct universalizes as normative
the particularities of the White, heteropatriarchal conception of
normal. A critical intervention into such a conflation of race with
other identity components will give true meaning to the indivisibil-
ity and interdependence structure of the human rights model,
which accepts rights as holistic. Such a reconstituted ideal becomes
invaluable as a tool to eradicate injustice and give Latinas/os and
all racial minorities an equal voice.
Other vestiges of the foundational inequalities resulting from
the hegemonic origins of the human rights regime persist. Women
lack full citizenship in all states of the global community. Similarly,
this construct denies full citizenship to racial, sexual, and ethnic
minorities within first world states, all people in third world states,
and indigenous peoples in all states-North and South, East and
West. Thus, notwithstanding the equality rhetoric, many persons
around the globe experience a widespread pattern of inequality in
access to education, health, and nutrition; in participation in the
social, political, and economic spheres; and in access to wealth,
resources, technology, and wages. These conditions provide a clear
opportunity to use local critical theory discourses to transform in-
ternational human rights principles in a manner that will promote
global justice.62 Our voices can make a difference for ourselves and
for those who remain silent either as evidence of fear or as acts of
resistance.
This observation identifies the polarization of the economic
development of states as a location in which a critical theoretical
intervention can inform human rights discourse. A critical
unveiling of the origins of human rights concerns also shows the
source of the pervasive inequalities attendant to market
60. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 21, at xiv.
61. See Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: Bring-
ing it Home, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 21, at 216, 216-17; see also DELGADO, THE
RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 17, at 95 (discussing the interdependence of "housing,
food, medical care, education, and other basic needs," which are second generation rights,
with first generation civil and political rights); Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a
Gendered Lens, supra note 38.
62. See Romany, supra note 34, at 89 ("International society can thus be viewed as a
blown-up liberal state which legislates in accordance with liberal humanistic values and
which accepts as part of a social contract those values which refer to the essential dignity
and freedom of human beings."); Young, supra note 53, at 16 ("[T]here is a deep similarity
between the underclass problem in rich countries and the problem of poor countries....
[T]hey too are economically 'not needed and politically harmless, but challenge our moral
foundations.' ").
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economies, and to the economic locations of states as core or
peripheral, developed or underdeveloped, North or South.
63
As previously noted, the polarization of the political interests of
states resulted in the severance of the human rights vision into civil
and political rights on the one hand and social, economic, and cul-
tural rights on the other.64 Currently, economic globalization is
having an effect on these historical developments. For example,
programs of aid to underdeveloped states were destined for fail-
ure, as they were not only highly bureaucratized but were
implemented without a thorough comprehension of the various
cultures and needs of diverse peoples and of the problems in the
societies receiving aid. Current turmoil surrounding WTO meet-
ings underscores the persisting economic divide.66 But it is flawed
to compartmentalize economics from civil and political rights. Re-
cent post-Cold War events reveal that great civil and political
discord flows if not directly, at least in part, from economic insta-
bility and inequality.67 The attendant consequences are increased
nationalism, ethnic strife, civil war, and human rights abuses,
which are challenges that the international community is strug-
gling to resolve, regrettably without marked success. s Significantly,
63. See, e.g., SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 19, at 427 ("[T]he
core-periphery hierarchy in the world system is the result of unequal exchange, a mecha-
nism of trade imperialism by means of which surplus-value is transferred from the periphery
to the core."); see also DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS, supra note 17, at ch. 3 (discussing
impact on quality of life of non-regulation of housing market).
64. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and So-
ciety Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1990); see also DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY
ENDS, supra note 17, at ch. 3 (discussing the impact of non-regulation on colonies within
the United States). But seeJane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J.
179 (1995) (suggesting that proper response to informal economics is gradualized formali-
zation to which Larson refers as "regularization" and rejecting "either or" options of
"outright deregulation" or "uniform regulation").
66. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After Riots, Seattle Is Chagrined Yet Cheerful N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1999, at A28 (describing the protests by critics of the WTO, who believe the organi-
zation puts the interests of multinational corporations over concerns of ordinary people
and the environment); Prague Protests Turn Violent (Sept. 26, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/
2000/WORLD/europe/09/26/prague.meeting.03/index.html> (describing the anti-
capitalist riots that erupted during the IMF and World Bank meeting in Prague, based on
the belief that the IMF and World Bank's structural, economic, and loan policies are re-
sponsible for all of the economic problems of the third world).
67. See SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 31.
68. See id.; see also Ralf Dahrendorf, The Changing Quality of Citizenship, in THEORIZING
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 53, at 16-17 (noting that post communist states do not have a
"bourgeoisie" concerned both about civil rights and economic growth which results in a
confusion that, in turn, makes persons seek a "citizenship" that is formulated on a desire to
belong to a homogeneous group-a "deplorable" result as "the true test of the strength of
citizenship rights is heterogeneity.").
[VOL. 5:817
Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal 837
SPRING 2000] Culture, Nationhood, and the Human Rights Ideal 253
the failure is attributable, in part, to the powerful states' unwill-
ingness to speak up for and listen to the less powerful states'
voices.
Effectively, it would be of great assistance in seeking full citizen-
ship for all persons to acknowledge that economic and civil and
political realities are quite common across the North/South or
East/West divides. Every first world state has an internal third
world, specifically, inner cities, "new underclasses," racial and eth-
nic minorities, the disenfranchised, economically marginalized
persons, and citizens whose race, sex, sexuality, class, religion, lin-
guistic ability, or nationality "others" them. The "silent" damage of
oppression reverberates around our largely unjust world. Critical
theorists have been analyzing these concerns as local matters. The
vast and rich literature generated by those examinations provides
valuable suggestions for corrective measures for the global chal-
lenges and conversations existing at the international level. 69
Similarly, critical analyses could develop, expand, and transform
the globalization discourse, and provide it with a broader mission,
one that could work to eradicate barriers in the understanding of
globalization's both positive and negative consequences.
Beyond reconceptualizing the discourse of economic globaliza-
tion, critical theory may have valuable input into crafting the
solutions for other conflicts that involve diverse peoples. Critical
movements can be instrumental in ensuring that human rights dis-
course does not simply become an echo of the master narrative,
but rather that these discourses assure that it incorporates respect
and appreciation for different cultures.
Significantly, however, just as critical theory can contribute to
the development and transformation of human rights discourse,
the international human rights complex can provide a valuable
and useful intervention into critical theory discourse in numerous
ways. To elucidate this exciting possibility, we show how such an
incorporation of an internationalist view can enrich analysis.
69. See generaly, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 21; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY
WRITINGS, supra, note 21; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE, supra note 21;
GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien K. Wing, ed. 2000); THE LATINA/O CONDITION,
supra note 1.
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Specifically, we use the writings of this Symposium as examples of
the utility of a reconstructed human rights paradigm.
First, by providing a construct in which rights are indivisible and
interdependent, the human rights framework helps move beyond
a comparative sameness/difference approach to equality.
70
International human rights classifications constitute a more
expansive and, consequently, more useful measure of an
individual's attainment of dignity, integrity, and full citizenship.
For example, the global standards for non-discrimination include
categories such as language, culture, and social origin. In regard to
providing the bases for any protections at all,71 many local
environments, including the United States, contest and reject
these categories. Moreover, a human rights indivisibility and
interdependence analysis requires that these categories as a whole
be the measure of an individual's equality, rather than the single-
trait fragmented analysis of United States jurisprudence.
Second, while critical theory scrutinizes and rejects normative
concepts that have institutionalized the "perpetrator perspective,"
it has not always succeeded in its enterprise without imposing an-
other perpetrator's viewpoint. Critical theory has provided
invaluable insights into the consequences of normalizing the
dominant viewpoint: the exclusion of all women of certain classes,
and of racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. For example,
critical race theory was founded upon the desire to effect "a left
intervention into race discourse and race intervention into left dis-
course."72  The resulting implementation of this approach,
however, was underinclusive and marginalized women of color,
Latinas/os, and others whose multidimensional identities, includ-
ing sex, race, color, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, national origin,
language, citizenship, and culture may alienate them not only
from the norm, but also from a single-dimensional view of.
"other.""3
70. For a brief discussion of the interdependence/indivisibility perspective, see
Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: Bringing it Home in
THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 21, at 216, 216-17; Herndndez-Truyol, Gendered Lens,
supra note 38.
71. See Hemndez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (addressing issues of language-
based discrimination); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990) (refusing to extend constitu-
tional protections regarding right to abortion to include public funding for the same);
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (concerning race and culture issues).
72. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 21, at xiv.
73. See, e.g., Perea, supra note 59 (noting how the Black/White paradigm does not
serve Latinas/os well in the struggle for attainment of equality).
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Indeed, the emergence of several Critical modalities under-
scores the need for and desirability of the indivisibility/
interdependence approach to rights and justice. The international
human rights prototype provides a blueprint for a multidimen-
sional critical paradigm that can be utilized to effect a participatory
society in which all persons can fully exercise and enjoy their rights
and obligations as equal citizens. Any system that prohibits or im-
pedes participation by any particular group, which may render that
citizenry subordinate, raises issues concerning the legitimacy of the
process itself,74 as well as the body guiding or implementing the
process, be it the state, or civil society as defined by the family,
school, or an ethnic, social, racial, or religious community. After
all, a truly legitimate civil and pluralistic society is one that seeks
the opinions and entertains the desires of all of its governed peo-
ples, notjust of the elite. No one is silenced in such a society.
Moreover, the multilingualism of the international human
rights tradition is a useful addition to domestic critical theory. A
body that listens only to one language from its people not only si-
lences groups within its realm that speak different tongues, but
also silences outside groups who share the language. Thus, import-
ing the human rights discourse's acceptance of multilingualism
serves to promote local acceptance of the voices of othered groups.
This Part explored the relationships of critical race theory to
human rights law. Part III reviews how the main works and the
comments in this Symposium, without specifically articulating a
human rights agenda or even contextualizing their themes within
the international human rights framework, embrace the central
human rights personhood ideal. This analysis elucidates how
globalizing critical theory and localizing human rights norms can
redefine notions of participation so that all persons can enjoy their
full complement of human rights.
III. RETOOLING THE NARRATIVES
The two central works of this Symposium, and their
accompanying comments serve to illuminate how a LatCrit human
74. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONGST NATIONS (1990);
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Rights to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 7
(1996); see also Hernhndez-Truyol, supra note 39.
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rights paradigm can be a valuable intervention into the
antisubordination project. First, Professor Montoya's basic desire
"to deepen the analysis of the interplay between the subordinating
aspects of being silenced and the liberatory aspects of silence, its
expressive and performative aspects that are part of our linguistic
and racial repertoires"' is facilitated by the human rights
construct, which protects not only language76 but also minority
cultures within majority communities7' and families.8
Professor Montoya's work provides examples of language's links
to subordination.8 She explores the negatives of silencing in the
African American, s° Latina/o, l and gay/lesbian communities.1 Yet
these examples would be well served by critically informed interna-
tional human rights analysis that offers the disempowered a
framework from which to raise their voices. Similarly, the libera-
tory aspects of silence are reinforced by the international human
rights prohibitions against hate speech-a protection much
broader than exists in the United States because of its rejection of
hate speech prohibition. 3 These protections, it seems, supply sup-
port to Professor Montoya's observation that "[1]anguages are not
neutral vehicles for the transmissions of thoughts [but] ... are
imbedded in the history and struggles of the people who use
them. "s
By protecting culture and cultural practices of minorities, the
human rights paradigm also supports Professor Montoya's vision.
Her ideal that silence, beyond being empowering can "disturb and
disrupt ... linguistic hegemony, ", 5 is well served by the proposed
critically informed human rights model. The interdependence and
indivisibility envisioned in such a format can collaborate with her
desire to unveil the inherent racialized and gendered nature of
silence/language and the concommitant cultural tropes and hier-
archies these perform. These norms can serve to empower
75. Montoya, supra note 3, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 850, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
266.
76. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 2.
77. See id. at art. 27.
78. See id. at art. 23.
79. See generally Montoya, supra note 3.
80. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 849, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 265.
81. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 873-79, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORIZ at 289-95.
82. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 849, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 265.
83. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 19.
84. Montoya, supra note 3, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 850, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
266.
85. Id.
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outsiders' language. Professor Montoya suggests norms be used to
destabilize hegemonic power, privilege, and the centripetal forces
of inclusion, multiculturalism, and cross-cultural dialogue. 6 These
forces, in turn, can serve as sources of understanding the ambigui-
ties of silence.
This critically retooled human rights paradigm also serves to
harmonize Professor Montoya's thesis with the commentators' ob-
servations. Professor Bender, for example, while recognizing the
power of silence to bring out the voices of the disempowered, also
shows how silence can be used to further entrench the disempow-
erment of the subordinated. 7 In doing so, he concludes that
"Professor Montoya's focus on the silencing of race and gender in
the law school classroom as the culprit for this 'pernicious' change
leads me to question whether my own focus on race and culture
makes the false promise to my students of the relevance of race in
legal education."88
Accepting the potential irrelevance of race in legal education
because the ethnic studies major might be confused, intimidated,
and ultimately silenced by the apparent irrelevance of this back-
ground 89 is a disservice to the student and the Academy alike. The
human rights model, and its indivisibility premise, makes race and
language relevant. Moreover, it makes race, language, and culture
central identity factors that are protected against subordinating
practices. The LatCrit human rights model provides the inspira-
tion Professor Bender seeks for the "progressive lawyer who aspires
to use law as a means of achieving and ensuring social justice ["90
Rather than spirit-breaking, it is a spirit-fulfilling approach. A criti-
cal human rights lens would likely have resulted in a different
outcome in Herndndez v. New York, 9' a case that deeply troubles
Professor Bender. Under a human rights lens, the court's misap-
prehension of the relationship between language and ethnicity
and language discrimination would not, indeed could not, occur
as language and ethnicity are protected categories. Moreover,
86. See id.
87. See generally Bender, supra note 4.
88. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 920, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 336.
89. See Montoya, supra note 3, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 894-98, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 310-14.
90. Bender, supra note 4, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 922, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
338.
91. 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (allowing for the peremptory exclusion of bilingual jurors);
see alsoJuan F. Perea, Latina/o Identity and Pan-ethnicity: Toward Latcrit Subjectivities: Five Axi-
oms in Search of Equality, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 231 (1997).
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under the proposed model, language or ethnic discrimination
would constitute, by definition, prohibited racial discrimination.
Professor Roberts's commentary illustrates how human rights
norms would enrich analysis. By focusing on how culture and
cultural tropes within minority communities can further subordi-
nate the disempowered, Professor Roberts notes that silences may
have multiple meanings.2 However, she questions whether silence
can be a strategy of resistance because of the difficulty of distin-
guishing silencing and silence as resistance, 93  and "the
complications of incorporating the study of silence into resistance
scholarship., 94 By observing how silence potentially constitutes
complicity in subordination, Professor Roberts, without having en-
gaged in a human rights analysis, nevertheless underscores its
value. The indivisibility and interdependence approach of the
critical human rights model, by eschewing an either-or dichoto-
mizing approach and instead taking a both-and view,95 allows the
evaluation of silence as both liberating and subordinating.
As Boaventura Santos has said, "people have the right to be
equal whenever difference makes them inferior, but they also have
a right to be different whenever equality jeopardizes their iden-
tity. ' 96 The human rights approach permits this ideal by disallowing
the deployment of silence as a tool of subordination but using cul-
ture and proscriptions against discrimination to enable and
protect silence as a liberating form of expression.
Professor P~rez-Sdnchez's article also presents a valuable oppor-
tunity to show the utility of the critically informed human rights
analysis. In particular, the piece shows the usefulness of the human
rights norm to challenge discriminatory state practice and offers a
context in which to depict the utility of an expanded and trans-
formed human rights regime and ideology.9 7 In describing
Franco's active focus on containing homosexuality, Professor
P~rez-Sinchez illustrates how a repressive state apparatus can ef-
fectively persecute and silence minorities-in this instance sexual
minorities. Principally, a central and critical aspect of the human
rights idea is that persons are subjects, rather than objects in the
92. See generally Roberts, supra note 5.
93. See id. at 5 Micn.J. RACE & L. at 928, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 344.
94. Id.
95. See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL, HUMAN RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE, supra
note 20.
96. SANTOS, TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL CONCEPTION, supra note 19, at 13.
97. See generally Prez-Sdnchez, supra note 9.
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international legal system.9s With this paradigm in place a state,
here Spain, is accountable for how it treats citizens. Therefore, in
the posited historical framework, Franco's persecution of homo-
sexuals, even if they were Spanish subjects, warrants scrutiny by the
international community because such persecution runs afoul of
established norms. A failure to scrutinize Franco's persecution of
homosexuals is silent complicity.
Focusing on whether persecution of persons based on their af-
fectional orientation violates human rights norms,99 we posit that
the answer is an unqualified yes. First, the non-discrimination pro-
visions of the Universal Declaration, 0 the ICCPR,'0 ' and the
Economic Covenant'02 all proscribe discrimination on the basis of
"race colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status."0 3 Dis-
criminating against citizens on the grounds of their sexuality could
constitute, under a critical interpretation and construction of this
provision, discrimination on the basis of sex, political or other
opinion, birth, or other status. Similarly, human rights norms pro-
vide for a right to equality. 0 4 Flowing from our analysis of the non-
discrimination clauses, it follows that discrimination on proscribed
grounds effects a denial of equal status.
Significant in the context of Franco's repression of homosexuals
is the protection of persons against degradation.' 00 A state's laws
and other conduct effecting isolation and degradation of its
citizens are anathema to the human rights ideas of personhood
and dignity. As such, rendering sexual others as subhuman
constitutes state-sponsored degrading treatment proscribed by
human rights norms. In particular, to consider a person illegal and
98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
99. SeeJames D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gen-
dered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REv. 989 (1997);
James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 66 n.295 (1994).
100. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 2.
101. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 2.
102. See International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, supra note
42, at art. 2, 3.
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 2; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 2, cl. 1; International Covenant
on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, supra note 42, at art. 2, cl. 2.
104. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 7; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 7; International Covenant on
Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, supra note 42, at art. 3.
105. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra note 16, at arts. 5, 7; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42.
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dangerous10 6 because of his or her affectional orientation is a
classification that places a human being in fear for his or her
safety. Any person under these conditions is rightly concerned that
he or she will be arrested and subjected to aversion therapy. Such
threats are effective silencers for many homosexuals. Indeed, to
live in such fear is a deep affront to one's dignity as well as to one's
feeling of safety and security.0 7
Moreover, the rights to liberty'0 8 and to freedom of movement'°9
are also at risk. Spain's security measures "0 mandated confinement
of homosexuals in special institutions,' permitted "confinement
in a re-education institution, [created a] prohibition from residing
in a place or territory designated [by the court], and [required]
submission to the surveillance of the delegates."
2
Another right exists that is significant in the context of Professor
Pdrez-Sinchez's work. It is contained in Article 27 of the ICCPR,
which provides: "In those states in which ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture.... to use their own lan-
guage. 0"3 Sexual minorities are not expressly listed within Article
27. Nonetheless the intent of the provision is to protect minorities
from the tyranny of the majority."4 As sexual minorities' rights
have been recognized and as the human rights community has
deemed it fit to extend its system's protections, a critical reading of
Article 27 should include sexual minorities. Moreover, especially
in light of Professor Prez-Sinchez's approach to homosexuality
both as performativity"" and as a counter-culture," 6 it is appropri-
106. See Pdrez-Sdinchez, supra note 9, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 958 n.56, 33 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM- at 374 n.56.
107. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 3 (calling for the
right to life, liberty, and security of the person); International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, supra note 42, at art. 9 (calling for the right to liberty and security of the person).
108. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 9;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra note 16, at art. 3.
109. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 12;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 16, at art. 13.
110. See Prez-Sdinchez, supra note 9, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 960, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 376.
111. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 964 n.85, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 380 n.85.
112. Id. at 5 MICn.J. RACE & L. at 959 n.58, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 375 n.58.
113. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 27.
114. See id. (protecting minorities from imposition of majority norms); see also
Hernindez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights, supra note 39.
115. See Prez-Sdnchez, supra note 9, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 944-45, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 360-61.
116. See id.
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ate to afford the "social group" homosexuals with cultural protec-
tions. In fact, the appropriateness of this approach is underscored
in the last part of Professor Perez-Sinchez's work in which homo-
sexuals are presented as a group or community in need of
protection against discrimination because of their cultural
tropes.1H7
This human rights framework also is useful in evaluating the
comments on Professor Pdrez-S~nchez's work. Professors Kapur
and Mahmud wish that Professor Pdrez-Sinchez had been more
forthcoming with her conception of state and state power and had
focused more on the "relationship between coercion and
ideology" as well as the "demarcation of the public and the
private.""" The suggested critical human rights lens, however,
renders these observations less pointed, for a state is responsible
for human rights violations, whether they are effected by
commissions or omissions. The latter brings into stark relief the
role of the public/private divide. If the private sector-civil
society-is acting in such a way so as to systematically effect
prohibited discriminations, the failure of the state to intervene
results in state responsibility.
Moreover, the human rights model incorporates not only the in-
ternational comparative angle but also feminist theory"9 and
critical race frameworks-providing diverse axes in which to en-
gage in analysis. Finally, Professor Pfrez-Sdnchez's use of literature
that Professor Kwan views as laudable is effectively built in to the
human rights model. Of course, this too is a metaphor that Profes-
sor Kwan seems to find somewhat puzzling in the work on which
he comments. Literature is a proxy for culture. Culture, as we have
discussed, is protected in the international arena. Cultural expres-
sions break dangerous and harmful silences.
CONCLUSION
The human rights model we have envisioned serves as a valuable
analytical tool for nation and culture. The main works of this Sym-
posium and their respective comments unveil the complexities of
117. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RAcE& L. at 971-86,33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM at 387-403.
118. Kapur & Mahmud, supra note 11, at 5 MICH.J. RACE& L. at 998,33 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM at 414.
119. See, e.g., Hernndez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered, supra note I (analyzing the role of
culture in Latina/o identity).
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language and silence, resistance and subordination, performativity
and the rule of law. Neither nation nor culture can be used as a
shield to insulate the state from responsibility and accountability
for the oppression of any person within its jurisdiction, or as a
sword to eviscerate the rights of those within its reach.
